KINI JAMAAH DAN CALEG NII KW9 AL-ZAYTUN GIGIT JARI MENUNGGU FUTUH YANG TAK JELAS

Kemarin pagi, saya mendapat informasi bahwa pada Sabtu, 11 April 2009, akhirnya Syaykh Al-Zaytun, YAB. Abdus Salam Rasyidi (Panji Gumilang) mengumpulkan para ‘pejabat’ NII (Negara Islam Indonesia) level wilayah (Gubernuran) bawahannya di Ma’had Al-Zaytun (MAZ) Indramayu. Mereka dikumpulkan setelah Partai RepublikaN dipastikan tidak mampu menembus batas ambang electoral threshold sebesar 2,5%. Itu artinya, kelima caleg dari NII (faksi Al-Zaytun) otomatis gagal menembus Senayan—berapapun jumlah suara yang mereka peroleh. Sang Imam mencoba membesarkan hati para pejabat bawahannya itu, yang saya peroleh dari seorang insider, intinya begini:

“Tidak perlu berkecil hati. Setidaknya, masyarakat telah mulai menerima kehadiran kita di kancah politik nasional.”

Kenyataan ini, jelas mengecewakan para jamaah NII faksi Al-Zaytun. Padahal, seluruh jamaah yang masih aktif sudah dikerahkan untuk ‘memilih’ di berbagai TPS di lima Dapil tempat kelima caleg itu dicalonkan. Bahkan, dengan persiapan hampir 7 bulan. Memang, berbagai komentar di facebook Imam Prawoto, salah satu caleg dari MAZ tersebut, para konstituen mencoba menghibur diri.

Siapa saja kelima caleg NII-MAZ yang gagal melenggang ke Senayan itu?

• Imam Prawoto

• Drs. Miftakh

• M. Soleh Aceng, SH

• dr. Dani Kadarisman

• Ir. Asrurrifak

***

Beberapa kader NII faksi Al-Zaytun (NII-MAZ) yang masih aktif di dalam ’struktur organisasi bercerita kepada saya tentang geliat Al-Zaytun untuk meloloskan caleg mereka. Namun, beberapa dari mereka menyesalkan: mengapa Imam Prawoto yang ditempatkan di Dapil Tangerang, yang otomatis Dapil paling gemuk—dan berpotensi besar menjadi lumbung suara serta meloloskan putra sulung Syaykh AS. Panji Gumilang itu, jika saja Partai RepublikaN lolos electoral threshold 2,5 %. Padahal caleg Drs. Miftakh dan M. Soleh Aceng S.H. jelas jauh lebih senior dan memiliki kompetensi leadership yang tidak kalah hebat.

“Mengapa tidak kader senior, seperti para pejabat setingkat Menteri atau eselon satu lainnya, yang sudah berjuang sejak tahun 1980-an. Apakah hanya karena beliau anak Syaykh Al-Zaytun. Kok jadi KKN gitu ?” keluh seorang kader NII faksi Al-Zaytun kepada saya.

“Ah, sudahlah. Tak perlu dikeluhkan. Lagi pula, kelima kader itu tak lolos juga, bukan?” jawab saya.

Sebagai catatan, tiga dari lima orang caleg tersebut memiliki kedudukan struktural penting dalam sistem organisasi NII faksi Al-Zaytun. Mohon maaf, jika saya tak bisa mengungkapkannya di sini.

Sebagai orang yang pernah memiliki kedekatan dengan kelima caleg tersebut di atas, juga dengan Syaykh A.S. Panji Gumilang, saya mencoba mengambil ibrah (pelajaran) dari kegagalan ini sehingga muncul pertanyaan: “Mengapa tidak sejak dulu saja memutuskan mengambil jalur kepartaian dalam berpolitik, ketika organisasi NII-MAZ masih begitu kuat? Padahal ketika itu ada momen yang begitu kuat untuk membentuk sebuah partai politik–yang akhirnya momen itu diambil secara cerdas oleh PKS.

Saya masih ingat betul, sehari setelah bertemu dengan Jusuf Kalla di kediaman beliau di Jalan Dharmawangsa pada masa Pilpres putaran kedua tahun 2004 lalu, Syaykh Al-Zaytun sempat berpikir untuk membentuk partai politik. Waktu itu, saya termasuk orang yang menjawab “setuju” ketika ditanya oleh “beliau”. Entah, mengapa kemudian rencana itu urung dilakukan.

Saya juga masih ingat betul, ketika berbagai pertemuan dilangsungkan di Wisma Fairbank Senayan, antara para pimpinan MAZ dan tokoh-tokoh politik Orba seperti Harmoko, Haryono Suyono, dan beberapa tokoh lain, yang sepertinya akan bermuara pada pembentukan sebuah partai politik. Namun, lagi-lagi saya hanya bisa bertanya dalam hati: “Entah, mengapa kemudian rencana itu pun urung dilakukan?”

Jika kemudian, artikel ini muncul, semata-mata karena saya resah dengan berbagai ketidakpastian yang dikeluhkan oleh beberapa teman di dalam barisan NII-MAZ–yang sepertinya juga dialami oleh sebagian besar kader-kader NII-MAZ–akan arah perjuangan mereka. Sementara di satu sisi, pengorbanan yang diberikan sudah begitu besar. Memang, meski saya sekarang berada di luar sistem, namun saya merasa bahwa masa 15 tahun keterlibatan saya di NII-MAZ (dengan berbagai konsekwensi terhadap diri dan keluarga saya) merupakan alasan bagi saya untuk tetap berhak ikut merasa resah.

Sekian dulu informasi singkat dari saya. Selengkapnya, nantikan saja sebuah buku yang sedang saya tulis—yang sementara ini akan saya beri judul “Mozaik Hitam Putih Al-Zaytun: Belajar dari Keunggulan dan Kelemahan NII Al-Zaytun”. Semoga, jika tak ada halangan, buku tersebut akan saya rampungkan pada akhir tahun ini.

Oh ya, bagi saya, buku tersebut merupakan bentuk tanggung jawab moral saya kepada seluruh jamaah dan mantan jamaah NII faksi Al-Zaytun. Melalui buku itu, kelak, saya ingin meluruskan berbagai informasi menyesatkan yang terlalu menghujat dan menempatkan kawan-kawan NII faksi Al-Zaytun sebagai orang sesat, serta mendudukkan organisasi itu sebagai organisasi tanpa nilai lebih. Padahal, organisasi ini memiliki begitu banyak potensi positif, yang bermanfaat bagi kemajuan umat dan masyarakat luas.

Tapi, sebaliknya, saya juga ingin menyampaikan berbagai pergulatan internal (perpecahan, praktik KKN dan miss-orientation) yang pada akhirnya membuat organisasi ini melalui grafik menurun, setelah sempat mengalami era keemasan pada periode 1994-2002.

Bagi saya, hanya satu hal yang membuat buku itu urung terbit, yakni jika terjadi rekonsiliasi di antara para elite NII-MAZ, antara mereka yang masih aktif “di dalam” dan yang berada “di luar sistem” untuk membicarakan masa depan organisasi, termasuk pertanggungjawaban aset organisasi yang saya perkirakan menyentuh angka triliun rupiah.

• (Maaf, khusus untuk posting ini, saya menutup pintu bagi diskusi dan komentar yang bersifat menghujat dan mencaci maki Ma’had Al-Zaytun dan NII-MAZ).

• (Artikel ini merupakan stimulan awal dari serangkaian upaya untuk memperbaiki MAZ dari luar sistem. Jadi, mohon maaf bagi teman-temanku yang merasa “terganggu” dengan posting ini. Semoga, posting ini bermanfaat bagi organisasi MAZ yang sedang kalian perjuangkan. Bagaimanapun, MAZ adalah aset umat yang harus diselamatkan).
• (Kepada Syaykh Al-Zaytun, mohon maaf jika Anda tidak berkenan dengan artikel ini. Sungguh, Anda merupakan orang yang sangat berjasa dalam pembentukan character building bagi banyak orang, termasuk diri saya).

Sumber : nii-alzaytun.blogspot.com

“Terrorism’s Toxic Strains”, Sidney Jones in The Age

“Terrorism’s Toxic Strains”,

Sidney Jones in The Age

After last week’s Bali bombing, one question repeatedly arises: What turns young Indonesians into suicide bombers? If we look at the five men who have chosen to become “martyrs” thus far, we know the answer is not poverty and desperation, and it’s not necessarily affiliation with Jemaah Islamiah - in fact, most of the suicide bombers so far haven’t been JI.

They have come from West Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi, from very different socioeconomic backgrounds. Only two were under the direct tutelage of the two fugitive Malaysians, Azahari Husin and Noordin Mohamad Top, who are at the top of everyone’s list of suspects in the latest blast, and only one was a graduate of a problematic school.

They almost certainly became suicide bombers for different reasons, meaning we have to break the problem down before we can begin to solve it. All would have come under the influence of an ideology called salafi jihadism that adds a political overlay to a puritanical vision of Islam by calling for war against the US and its allies. The aim is to avenge Muslim deaths in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, including by targeting Western civilians. But all five men would have interpreted the ideology through local lenses.

The five bombers are as follows:

· Iqbal, alias Arnasan, who died in the first Bali attack in October 2002, belonged to a splinter group of Darul Islam in Banten, West Java.

· Ashar Daeng Salam, alias Aco, who blew himself up in a McDonald’s restaurant in Makassar in December 2002, belonged to a Sulawesi-based group called Laskar Jundullah.

· Bachtiar, alias Manto, blew himself up prematurely in his father’s house in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in August 2003. He belonged to a local Poso group, probably working with a Java-based group called KOMPAK. (KOMPAK is an Islamic charity that has mixed genuine humanitarian efforts with financing of jihadist activities. It also trained its own fighters in Ambon and Poso.)

· Asmar Latin Sani, from Bengkulu, Sumatra, probably JI and a graduate of Abu Bakar Bashir’s Ngruki school, was the suicide bomber in the August 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta.

· Heri Golun detonated the car bomb in front of the Australian embassy in September last year. He was from the same Banten group as Iqbal.

Iqbal wrote in his suicide note that he hoped his death would give his friends encouragement to restore the glory of the Islamic state proclaimed by the founder of Darul Islam in West Java, Kartosoewirjo. Aco, who was from Poso, and Bachtiar almost certainly saw themselves as avenging Muslim deaths in their own neighbourhoods. (In our research in 2003 we learnt that more than 20 young men from the Poso area had been tapped as suicide bombers, but we never found out what happened to them.)

Asmar Latin Sani was the one person who, with a long indoctrination in school, followed by close association with Noordin, may have been motivated solely by the idea of making the ultimate sacrifice to strike out at the enemies of Islam. Heri Golun’s suicide note has never been made public, but he was from a Darul Islam family in a Darul Islam stronghold and probably shared some of Iqbal’s desire to follow in the footsteps of Kartosoewirjo. Once selected as the bomber for the embassy bombing, however, he was given intensive religious instruction for about two months, and for the last few weeks was supervised by Noordin and Azahari.

The five men thus represent three pools of recruits: those inspired by a living legacy of rebellion (West Java), those with grievances from recent communal conflicts (Poso), and those indoctrinated in the tiny handful of JI schools. None of these potential recruits would act on his own, however: they have to be plucked from the pool by a more senior jihadist figure respected for his religious knowledge.

To address the problem, one can try to influence the recruits or the mentors or both. The only people the mentors are going to listen to are men with unquestioned salafi jihadist credentials and religious knowledge equal to their own. Exhortations from “moderate” Muslims will fall on deaf ears, and you will never get these men to take part in interfaith dialogues. One priority for the Indonesian Government should be how to persuade jihadists who are opposed to indiscriminate attacks on civilians - and there are many - to reach out to others, including in the JI schools. It may be that this will happen on its own, but if there is any way to facilitate the process, including enlisting repentant prisoners, it would be desirable.

In the Poso area where there are specific local grievances - unresolved issues of justice, displaced people, land seizures - assistance programs aimed at involving young mujahideen might help. West Java is more difficult, because it’s not just the Darul Islam legacy, it’s the fusion with salafi jihadism that makes such a lethal mixture.

Suicide bombing is now clearly an established practice in Indonesia, but we don’t have to throw up our hands in despair and wait for the next attack. If we do more to understand the problem, we might be able to tackle it.

Sidney Jones is South-East Asia project director of the International Crisis Group.

OVERVIEW

Just past the half-year mark of the agreement to end the conflict in Aceh, several long-anticipated problems are surfacing. None by itself is grave enough to derail the 15 August 2005 accord between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM); the peace process remains very much on track. But their convergence means that more than ever, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla will have to exert leadership, and international donors will have to constantly assess the political impact of their assistance to prevent any backsliding.

The problems include differences between Jakarta and Aceh over the concept of self-government; efforts to divide the province; questions over who can run in local elections and when those elections take place; urgent employment needs of returning GAM members; and oversight of funding for reintegration programs.

The most contentious issue is the draft law on governing Aceh that is supposed to incorporate the provisions of the 15 August memorandum of understanding (MoU) and replace a 2001 law that gave Aceh “special autonomy” within the Indonesian republic. The ministry of home affairs watered down a draft produced in Aceh through a wide public consultation and submitted the diluted version to the Indonesian parliament. Concern over the weakened bill is not confined to GAM but is shared among all in Aceh – and there are thousands – who took part in the original drafting or in subsequent discussions. Intensive efforts are underway to restore key provisions of the Aceh draft, and there is still a chance a reasonable compromise could emerge.

The campaign to carve two new provinces out of Aceh remains an irritant but appears to have no support from the Yudhoyono goverment.

Another issue, repeatedly flagged by Crisis Group, is the reintegration of GAM members. Securing adequate livelihoods for the 3,000 combatants mentioned in the August agreement was going to be difficult enough, given the massive needs in Aceh after the tsunami. It has become increasingly clear, however, that there are more GAM members needing and expecting reintegration assistance than was previously thought. How to allocate reintegration payments budgeted for 3,000 among a much larger number is as much an issue for GAM as for the government and international agencies, but the program set up to address this in Aceh may cause as many problems as it solves.

A final issue is the role of the European-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) if local elections are delayed, as now seems inevitable. Originally scheduled for 26 April 2006, they are now likely to be postponed until late July or August, given both delays in passing the above law and the logistics of post-tsunami registration. This means they will almost certainly take place after the AMM’s newly-extended term expires. The AMM is now scheduled to leave Aceh on 15 June 2006. Many Acehnese are concerned because the pre-election period is precisely when clashes requiring a neutral arbiter may erupt.

Jakarta/Brussels, 29 March 2006